

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WAYLON PATRICK,

Defendant.

No. CR13-3001-MWB

**ORDER CONCERNING
MAGISTRATE'S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION REGARDING
DEFENDANT'S RULE 11(c)(1)(C)
GUILTY PLEA**

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

On May 23, 2013, defendant Waylon Patrick was charged in a Second Superseding Indictment with conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more methamphetamine which contained 50 grams or more of pure methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846, possessing with intent to distribute 8.9973 grams of pure methamphetamine, within 1,000 feet of a school or playground, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 860(a), and distributing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). On February 24, 2014, defendant appeared before United States Magistrate Judge Leonard T. Strand and entered a plea of guilty to Counts 1 and 11 of the Second Superseding Indictment, under a binding plea agreement, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). In the plea agreement, the parties have stipulated to a sentence of 156 months imprisonment. This sentence may be concurrent, consecutive, or partially concurrent and partially consecutive to any undischarged term of imprisonment in *State v. Waylon Patrick*, case number FECR344406 in Iowa District Court for Webster County.

On the same day, Judge Strand filed a Report and Recommendation in which he recommends that defendant's guilty plea be accepted. No objections to Judge Strand's Report and Recommendation were filed.¹ The court, therefore, undertakes the necessary review of Judge Strand's recommendation to accept defendant's plea in this case.

II. ANALYSIS

The court reviews the magistrate judge's report and recommendation pursuant to the statutory standards found in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1):

A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006); *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) (stating identical requirements); N.D. IA. L.R. 72, 72.1 (allowing the referral of dispositive matters to a magistrate judge but not articulating any standards to review the magistrate judge's report and recommendation). While examining these statutory standards, the United States Supreme Court explained:

Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute does not require the judge to review an issue *de novo* if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, *sua sponte* or at the request of a party, under a *de novo* or any other standard.


¹The parties have waived the fourteen day period in which to file objections to Judge Strand's Report and Recommendation.

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985). Thus, a district court *may* review de novo any issue in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation at any time. *Id.* If a party files an objection to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, however, the district court *must* "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In the absence of an objection, the district court is not required "to give any more consideration to the magistrate's report than the court considers appropriate." *Thomas*, 474 U.S. at 150.

In this case, no objections have been filed. As a result, the court has reviewed the magistrate judge's report and recommendation under a clearly erroneous standard of review. *See Grinder v. Gammon*, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting when no objections are filed and the time for filing objections has expired, "[the district court judge] would only have to review the findings of the magistrate judge for clear error"); *Taylor v. Farrier*, 910 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting the advisory committee's note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) indicates "when no timely objection is filed the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record"). Therefore, the court **accepts** Judge Strand's Report and Recommendation, and accepts defendant's plea of guilty in this case to Counts 1 and 11 of the Second Superseding Indictment. However, the court will not decide at this time whether it will accept the parties' Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and the agreed upon sentence in that plea agreement. Instead, the court will make that determination at the end of the sentencing hearing in this case. In the event the court decides not to accept the terms of the parties' plea agreement, defendant will be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty, or not withdraw his guilty plea and proceed with the sentencing. *See* FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(5).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 24th day of February, 2014.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Mark W. Bennett". The signature is written in a cursive style with a horizontal line extending from the end of the name.

MARK W. BENNETT
U. S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA